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(Immutability of the Past) 
 
 
Not the gods can shake the Past. 




I think that the title ‘Immutability of the past’ well represents the 
theoretical horizon where the articles of this volume containing in-
quiries from various disciplinary stances and different philosophical 
and scientific traditions converge. The issue is a result of the research 
programme about ‘The problem of indeterminacy. Meaning, knowled-
ge, action’ (‘Il problema dell’indeterminatezza. Significato, conoscen-
za, azione’, PRIN 2015, national coordinator Luigi Perissinotto). The 
project was developed by a Cagliari research team that worked on 
the indeterminacy problem concerning the linguistic, conceptual and 
interpretative mechanisms actively involved in the construction of the 
images of the past. These concepts and other themes were the sub-
ject of a conference in May 2019. The outcomes are now mostly pre-
sented in this number. The great questions of representation, fancy, 
figurative languages, image (as a form shaping matter and not mere-
ly reproducing a given structure) and time (and the relationship 
amongst past, present and future) are preeminently but not exclu-
sively linked to the past as it is investigated by historians (past hu-
man actions and resulting chains of events). The internal develop-
 
 Translated by Simonluca Pinna. 
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ment of such a line of research naturally concerns other methods, 
languages and ways to refer to the past. The link amongst ‘profes-
sional’ historical representations, the ordinary expressions of the rec-
ollecting memory, the forms of the sociocultural processing of the 
shared memory, namely, the forms of life and the ways a community 
uses to represent itself should be considered. In this sense, the prob-
lem of the relationship between history and memory promotes a con-
vergence between the interpretation-focused disciplines and the hu-
man sciences based on explicative, empirical and statistical orienta-
tion. 
The methodological and thematic evolution and the ramification 
of historical research generate a powerful enhancement in many oth-
er fields in the linguistic comparison of historiography and natural 
(and social) sciences. Specialistic and academic history today appears 
as an extremely varying patchwork of approaches, vocabularies and 
methodologies that is reducible neither to a unitary building nor to di-
chotomies variously characterising the 20th century debates in phi-
losophy (spirit-nature, explaining-understanding, nomological-
ideographic, causality-meaning, the ‘two cultures’ of humanities and 
sciences). If the great lesson of the Annales made its mark above all 
on the integration of history with social sciences, the diffusion of 
comparative programmes of global history – according to which West 
and East, Asia, Europe, America, Africa and Oceania cannot be stud-
ied and understood separately – shifted the balance even further by 
elucidating the systematic connection with natural sciences (see 
Moore 1997; D. Sachsenmaier 2011). However, history is strongly in-
tertwined with biology in relation to problems associated with the 
food, propagation and preservation of species, environment, domesti-
cation and decease; the impact depth of the human intervention in 
the biological traits of plants and animals cannot be underestimated. 
Biology and ecology provide indispensable survey information for his-
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torians. Naturally, each discipline keeps its conceptual and methodo-
logical autonomy, but interactions modify the general scheme of 
Global History inquiries1. 
Based on this background, our theme, i.e. the immutability or 
definitiveness of the past, can be applied to compare the different 
images of time, revealing new approaches to the problem of the truth 
of historical descriptions and to the question of the sources, motiva-
tions and scopes of the reference to the past. Let us try to under-
stand why. 
Our common experience of time recalls a sensation of constant 
flow, which progressively detaches us from more or less distant but 
ended affairs that cannot be intuitively intervened. The aspect of 
completeness remains untouched by the bonds of the past with future 
consequences and developments, which conversely are at least in 
part subject to our decisions and actions. Time flows in one direction 
and does not come back. This simple and intuitive ‘schema’ appears 
to be embodied in the shared practices of remembering and manag-
ing information about the past as indispensable elements of the sense 
of ourselves and of our personal and collective stories. The various 
dimensions of memory, as the ability to store traces of the past, play 
a fundamental role in building such a perspective. To some extent, 
this image is the effect of a long process of cultural sedimentation, 
especially if it is connected with the linear and ‘progressive’ image of 
historical time (different from the cyclical one) that generally happens 
 
1 See Rossi (2012: 423-453). I have drawn the successive references from that 
chapter, which is entitled ‘Verso una storia globale’ (‘Towards a global history’). For 
example, historically speaking, Rossi points out how population genetics (according 
to Cavalli-Sforza and others) modified the traditional scheme of physical 
anthropology and showed many relevant facts of distribution and migration. A host 
of indispensable phenomena for the understanding of historical changes 
(urbanisation, flight from the land, change in hygienic behaviours, decrease in the 
mortality rate, sources of energy and impact of the industrial revolution) 
highlighted the relevance of the relationship with the natural environment for 
historical studies on archaic and modern societies. 
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with modern Westerners. It has become an undisputed and sponta-
neously shared element of our life scenario and cultural landscape. 
In addition to being well-established in daily practices, the repre-
sentation of time, together with its own corollaries (determinacy of 
the past, openness and indeterminacy of the future, irreversible di-
rection of becoming), has been supported by a wide consensus and 
strong justifications in various specialised fields and experts’ circles, 
from historiography to thermodynamic models in physics or to the 
‘archivistic’ theories of memory as a preservation-reproduction func-
tion of past experiences. According to the latter perspective, the past 
surrounds us as a web of external traces, which are examined by pro-
fessional studies (the ‘sciences of culture’); moreover, the past condi-
tioned us internally in the form of persistent mental traces of the 
events and material (notably, cerebral) inscriptions, which are a pre-
rogative of psychological and neurological research. As for historians, 
a kind of realism should be discussed, i.e. realism that is more or less 
spontaneously presupposed or ‘certain’ in the sense of Ludwig Witt-
genstein’s Gewissheit or Husserl’s Lebenswelt. It is part of a tacitly 
shared background of truisms. Without it, the past cannot be de-
scribed to be accomplished and be ‘apart’ from the present, even if it 
is not completely known. It is associated with the grammar embodied 
in our ordinary speech, as suggested by Wittgenstein’s incisive exam-
ple of Earth before our birth2. 
The idea that we cannot act on the past causally seems to offer 
an archetypal model of objective reality that is meant and experi-
enced as a set of states of affairs independent from us. Such a model 
is recognised even by authors of a strong hermeneutical sensibility 
such as Paul Ricoeur3. Some things are done in certain ways that we 
 
2 I am talking about the observations in Wittgenstein (1969) and in particular §§ 
84, 85, 183 ff. 
3 In Entre la mémoire et l’histoire – a short but acute presentation of the topics of 
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cannot change and this concept applies to human history (with its so-
cial, institutional and symbolic dimensions) no less than to natural 
evolution. Obviously, in the Hermeneutic tradition, this recognition is 
inconsistent with Heidegger’s legacy. His fundamental ontology intro-
duces a turning point in the way the structures of time are seen. It 
also reshuffles the relationships amongst temporal dimensions, un-
derscoring the aspects of continuity and organicity in the experience 
of time. Heidegger capitalised on the phenomenological analyses tak-
en by Husserl in the early 20th century, resulting in the lessons about 
the phenomenology of the internal time consciousness that Heidegger 
himself edited in 1928. Being and Time presented a very influential 
analysis of time from an ontological viewpoint independent of episte-
mological and methodological interests and destined with the anti-
objectivist controversy to enhance the chasm between philosophical 
and scientific culture. It is a notable philosophical course, but it leads 
to a different direction from the specific interest discussed in here. 
Thus, we should not follow it. 
In the case of culture and historical thought, a realist’s standard 
view almost naturally develops with the interest in rebuilding wide 
chains of events, which can be very distant in time and independent 
of individual memory but can be linked to it as part of a cultural 
memory belonging to particular communities; however, it also origi-
nates in a sort of species memory. We must be aware that this image 
of the past depends on a network of presuppositions that are much 
 
La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, which was published in digital form in 2002 – Ricoeur 
points out three enigmatic aspects of memory: a) presence (of an image or trace in 
mind), b) absence (of the past thing the image refers to) and c) antecedence of 
what happened (temporal distance feeling expressed through verbs or adverbs; one 
remembers that something existed aupavarant). The latter aspect fosters 
historians’ spontaneous realism. The reality of the past is the complement of 
memory practice, that is, the certainty that something actually happened is a tacit 
element of our ordinary way of remembering; we could consider it as a background 
aspect of ordinary knowledge. Ricoeur talks elsewhere of croyance antéprédicative 
– et même prénarrative on which the basic matrices of historical knowledge lie. 
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more complex than what appears at first glance and that it has to ad-
dress questions and sometimes real challenges emerging from the 
development of specialised studies on various areas of the current 
scientific, academic and cultural scenario. In the following pages, the 
developments in the late 20th and in the very beginning of the 21st 
century, which are also the context of the studies collected in this 
number of Critical Hermeneutics, are outlined. 
 
2. 
A certain number of problems are raised by philosophers interested in 
the nature and limits of historical knowledge. Various questions sim-
ultaneously arise in the nonphilosophical areas of research and exper-
imental studies on psychology and neurobiology about memory and 
subatomic physics about the structures of time. Signals and conflict-
ing perspectives come from specialised areas that are characterised 
by tensions hard to be defused. 
Before the point is presented, clarification is needed. On the one 
hand, the modifiability of the images of the past, interpretative plas-
ticity, openness and incompleteness of our knowledge or even the 
conceptual indeterminacy of descriptions and flexibility of the ‘repre-
sentation system’ of past events should be discussed and all of these 
aspects are associated with the forms of the knowledge of the past. 
On the other hand, the indeterminacy of the past, namely, as the on-
tological referent of our descriptions, as a reality endowed with a 
proper consistency, should be explained and our surveys try to ex-
pound it. Therefore, in different specialised worlds and research tradi-
tions, the intuitive distinction seems to blur and fade in importance; 
otherwise, it is openly seen as problematic, if not untenable. In an-
other emerging idea, the past is nothing more than a shapeless mat-
ter, which is infinitely malleable for an interpreter (pure stuffism; see 
Sidelle 1998). As such, traces have no any objective past to be com-
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pared with. Postulating the determinacy of the events and their ob-
jective independence of our practices would be an extremely strong 
abstraction and it is as useless and misleading as the Kantian idea of 
the thing in itself. The events as determined in their own objectivity 
are inaccessible or even nonexistent at certain levels of reality. All we 
can do is organise and analyse the pure matter of the traces in line 
with our cognitive and noncognitive interests through conceptual and 
linguistic conventions. According to these positions and successive 
debates, the border between ontic and epistemic indeterminacy tends 
to become thin and flexible. However, such an outcome seems to be 
attributed to the insufficient perception of the central position and 
theoretical importance of a conceptual distinction that we cannot 
easily eliminate. It is – if not indelible – deeply rooted in our intui-
tions. 
We present some examples of the research areas where the 
main concerns about our topic originate. A certainly restless domain 
has been the philosophy of history. In general, antirealist accounts 
reject the determinacy of the past, assuming a dual line between 
epistemology and ontology. Good examples can be found in the 
works of Hayden White, Hans Kellner, Frank Ankersmit and Keith 
Jenkins4. 
In the field of ‘philosophy of memory’, the most radical construc-
tionist positions have criticised the idea of ‘memory fidelity’. Memory 
is basically selective and distorting, but it is in a certain way always 
false. Furthermore, the objectivity of the past is discussed at least in 
epistemic terms. Kourken Michaelian claimed that memory can ex-
pand the information about the past and go beyond what is experi-
 
4 I mention some of the most representative cases of the now enormous body of 
writings in philosophy of history: White (1973) is certainly the prototype of the 
narrativist tendency of second generation (of literary matrix) that is generally 
labeled “postmodernism” in the debates; other important examples are White 
(2010), Kellner (1989), Jenkins (2008) or Ankersmit (2012), while a very relevant 
collection is Ankersmit and Kellner (1995). 
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enced as in the case of an episodic (noninferential) memory concern-
ing particular, specific and singular experiences (one-off experiences, 
such as remembering the birth of a little bird or a visit to Rome). The 
case of ‘boundary extensions’ is typical. It is a series of visual 
memory experiments involving showing some photos to a subject 
that has to reproduce them (e.g. in form of sketches); in remember-
ing a particular photo, missing details are added and predictions 
about what lies beyond the visual boundaries of the original image 
are provided5. 
Two serious threats to the common experience of sequential 
time are likely observed in fundamental physics. On the one hand, in-
fluential interpretations of quantum mechanics validate the idea of 
the intrinsic ontic indeterminacy of reality. In other words, the inde-
terminacy of matter states is not derived from the lack of information 
or cognitive limitations. On the other hand, the thesis of the nonex-
istence or irrelevance of time is based on some developments of the 
relativistic paradigm. The theoretical possibility of influencing the past 
is also discussed in some philosophical research areas, such as time 
travel (see Torrengo 2011). 
If we literally consider the abovementioned developments, we 
should believe that our stories, which are characterised by temporal 
evolution both in biological and cultural senses, are a sort of (poten-
tially illusory) diachronic bubble floating on a neo-Parmenidean plat-
form; otherwise, we should accept the idea of a past becoming ‘de-
terminate’ (taking on a well-structured form) only under the selection 
of our memories and ex post reconstructions. I do not think that this 
outcome is unavoidable; however, if we must reach it, the path is 
long and tricky. I will try to prove this concept in the following sec-
tions by recreating the points of departure of such theses with some 
 
5 Consider fn. 21 below for the latter references. For the rest, see Michaelian 
(2011). 
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details. The points are also the background of the articles presented 
here. Indeed, the latter are limited surveys about historical 




Questions on the epistemology, ontology and philosophy of language 
are related to the philosophical discussion about the historical past. 
All of these aspects, which are implied in the analysis of the descrip-
tive function of historiographical language, have unsettled the philos-
ophy of history of literature for decades. For the past half century, 
new and lively controversies have emerged between realists and con-
structivists, epistemological monists and thinkers of hermeneutical 
orientation, idealists of Neokantian ancestry, postmoderns, narrativ-
ists and nihilists of truth. These debates are based on the remarkable 
impression of some case studies at ethical, civil or cultural levels (e.g. 
the Shoah with its uniqueness, speakability and memory duty or the 
historiography of genocides). A wide spectrum of research orienta-
tions highlights the complexity of the mechanisms governing the ex-
periential, linguistic and conceptual construction of the historiograph-
ical images of the past and the plurality of cognitive criteria and in-
terests directing the elaboration of the mere traces. 
With the late outcomes and more radical forms of the ‘linguistic 
turn’, along with a strong narrativist and anti-positivist tradition, new 
discussions concerning the accessibility itself of past events and the 
referential function of historiographical descriptions have been pre-
sented. Many authors proposed to deflate or diminish the role of the 
concept of truth if it is not within the assertable causal chains at least 
in the understanding of the meaning of wide sets of historical events. 
I would like to focuse on one of them, namely, William Henry Walsh, 
who has not yet obtained the place he deserves in the reconstructions 
Editor’s Introduction 
X 
of such studies. Without being driven by any antirealist perspectives, 
he initiated debates on the constructive role of colligatory concepts6. 
Some examples of the latter are as follows: cold war, Hungarian 
revolution, Early Middle Ages, democratic expansion, democratic 
revolution, Carolingian Renaissance, Florentine Enlightenment, impe-
rialism, capitalism and Church, which are similar to Max Weber’s ideal 
types. However, such expressions raise numerous questions. For in-
stance, their referential range is debatable because of the vagueness 
of the borders introduced to the continuity of the historical process; 
consequently, the identity conditions of their referent become unde-
fined. In the linguistic perspective, the object of historiography has to 
be reconstructed from a scattered and fragmentary set of data, doc-
uments, memories, testimonies and material traces. It is a synthetic 
and connecting procedure that creates complex aggregates by estab-
lishing more or less strong nexuses amongst the parts and highlight-
ing the relationship patterns between individuals and groups that are 
the actors of such aggregates. At the epistemological level, the dis-
cussion focuses on the validity (nonarbitrariness and conventionality 
grade) of the connections that the historical inquiry defines by dis-
secting constantly changing global processes derived by human ac-
tions. The question of setting boundaries, which are strictly connected 
to the debates around ‘vagueness’, casts a philosophical doubt about 
the degree of the dependence of these concepts on the ‘representa-
tion system’ and the level of the nature of the represented object. 
This question is hard to maintain in the epistemological field. It inevi-
 
6 Walsh, a philosopher formed at Merton College in Oxford, approached the issue 
for the first time in the essay The Intelligibility of History (Walsh 1942), which 
resumed and revised in An Introduction to philosophy of History (Walsh 1951) and 
in Colligatory Concepts in History (in Gardiner 1974: 127–144). The term 
‘colligation’ derives from Whewell (1847)’s analyses of induction. This kind of 
concepts is generated by an act that, unlike Bacon’s induction, unifies data under a 
connection rule, namely, establishes the limit of a conceptual unity holding together 
the phenomena. The colligation is in this sense a well-defined phase of the 
historical interpretation. 
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tably refers to the ontological dimension, above all if one thinks about 
the role of the colligatory concepts not in the sphere of origins and 
developments (causal sequences), but in the sphere of interpretation. 
An interpretative activity aims to grasp the sense characterising a 
historical path in terms of its interesting and global qualities by mak-
ing it intelligible and rational according to the logic of the part–whole 
connection. The latter has to be distinguished from the cause–effect 
nexuses. 
Considering only the speculative ‘spasms’ in these debates would 
be wrong. The point could only be clarified by the words of a histori-
an. The following text incisively exposes the hidden dangers in the 
construction mechanisms of the image of an event. It shows the ac-
tual genesis of the image within the historical praxis, as characterised 
by a wide plurality and plasticity of the interpretations of the past. 
However, emphasis on the prospective limits of any historical recon-
struction can be misunderstood. It can raise a doubt that the investi-
gated phenomenon has a defined form and likely generates fading ef-
fects or analytical disintegration of an object (an old-fashioned de-
composition strategy formerly practiced by Hume in the case of mate-
rial objects and personal identity). The passage is from an influential 




Has fascism ever existed? 
Perhaps fascism has never existed. 
Anonymous from the 21st century 
 
The history of fascism is a strange and singular story. 
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After almost 90 years from its appearance in history and 
after more than half a century from its disappearance as a 
key player of the political actuality, fascism seems a rather 
mysterious object evading a clear and rational historical 
definition even though it has been discussed in tens of 
thousands books, articles and debates. 
[…] The history of the interpretation of fascism is strange 
and singular. Indeed, interpretations vary amongst so 
opposite and irreconcilable views that one can sometimes 
judge the hope of defining the nature of fascism in largely 
shared terms as totally useless. […] 
[F]or 80 years, the nature of fascism and its meaning in 
contemporary history have been continuously discussed: 
whether it was an autonomous movement or an instrument 
of different forces, whether it had an ideology and a culture, 
whether it was modern or antimodern, whether it was 
revolutionary or reactionary and authoritarian or totalitarian. 
However, no agreement about the position of fascism in 
time and space has been reached: the place and time of its 
origin are still a matter of debate; studies have yet to 
determine whether fascism was an exclusively Italian 
episode or a universal one, whether it is correct to talk of 
‘fascism’ as a unique phenomenon with many variants or of 
‘fascisms’ as different trees with some shared features;, 
whether an ‘age of fascism’ was chronologically definable or 
whether a sort of ‘eternal fascism’, whose traces could date 
back to Cain and which is now hanging over the human 
existence as a forthcoming and real danger, actually exists. 
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In other words, fascism has a ‘Homeric question’. […] As for 
the Greek poet, opinions on fascism are conflicting not only 
about the place and date of birth but also about its very 
existence. The latter feature is actually challenged by those 
who claim that fascism is not an autonomous political 
movement with its own ideology, culture and political 
system, similar to liberalism or communism; instead, it has 
been only considered an epiphenomenon, that is, the 
contingent and extreme secretion of other phenomena, such 
as the anti-proletarian reaction of the bourgeoisie, the moral 
disease of the European consciousness, the pathological 
degeneration of the mass society and the explosion of 
century-old shortcomings of people who were still immature 
for liberal democracy. According to this view, fascism would 
be a historical total negativity and had no proper 
autonomous and specific (and conceptually definable) 
reality. Some scholars proposed to banish the concept of 
‘fascism’ from the scientific community because it would not 
have any precise meaning corresponding to a real historical 
phenomenon. With the same argument, other scholars 
asked for the adoption of an equal measure against the 
concept of ‘totalitarianism’ […]. [I]n light of successive 
theories about totalitarianism, which was established by 
some political scientists only on the basis of nazism and 
stalinism, fascist totalitarianism has been peremptorily 
described to be nonexistent. Even more drastically, other 
scholars affirmed that no form of totalitarianism has ever 
historically existed. If this trend becomes popular, one 
cannot exclude that some revisionist, postmodernist or 
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deconstructionist historians or political scientists may state 
that fascism has never existed7. 
The passage ironically exposes the framework underlying an 
analytically decomposing and deconstructionist approach by refusing 
the result of the radical historiographical relativism that openly denies 
the determinacy and existence of the past. This approach tacitly 
presupposes that historiography works on a raw material by 
introducing, with its own conventional criteria of linguistic 
identification, a network of objects and events that would remain 
otherwise nonexistent. The traces of the past appear under this light 
as a shapeless piece of information that can be taken in infinitely 
many ways without even establishing the correct way of dissecting 
the historical world or whether such a way is available8. Notably, the 
reasoning can be applied to material objects as well. A typical 
example of this kind of discussion is a dismantled clock on a 
clockmaker’s table. Is it still an individual object that is ‘dismantled’ 
or a set of more simple objects that are the aggregated parts 
thereof?9 Considering psychological or practical kinds (regarding 
advantages in sectioning the things in a particular way) cannot 
specify the ontological building blocks of the world; consequently, our 
distinctions are always arbitrary and conventional. Hence, 
distinguishing objects and events would be an arbitrary act, which is 
not supported by objective and intrinsic identification criteria. 
 
7 The passage is from the Introduction to Gentile (2005). 
8 For the problems concerning the conventionalist paradigms in general, see Morena 
(2004). 
9 For the criteria of object partition or aggregation, Hillary Putnam’s analyses 
against metaphysical realism are well known and always suggestive. See Putnam 
(1990: 96 ff; 1987: 18 ff). 
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A particularly insidious version of historiographic relativism was 
illustrated (and condemned) by Beham McCullogh in the essay 
Colligation and Classification in History (McCullogh 1978). Different 
cultures describe the same thing in different ways. Viewpoints, 
rationality standards, and practical interests underlying descriptions 
change. A disease can be explained in terms of evil spirits or modern 
medicine. Even medical explanations may change the paradigm. If we 
are caged in our culture horizon, we cannot have the true knowledge 
of a world independent of our (or other) culture. The world is a 
construction that is entirely built with ‘local’ and untranscendable 
concepts and beliefs. Indeed, some authors who are totally certain of 
the nonexistence of past events can make true historical descriptions 
simply because events are mere constructions of historians, are made 
possible by the descriptions of the historians themselves and cannot 
be emancipated by a particular life world (see Roth 2012). 
The arguments McCullogh moved against such developments are 
worth mentioning. He took advantage of solid conceptual distinctions 
and had no fear of admitting the problems of realist theories that are 
too focused on perception as the basic level of knowledge. Assuming 
the untenability of any idea of correspondence, he proposed a weaker 
form of the correlation theory of truth. Certainly, studies on cultural, 
conceptual and cognition-based differences have shown that 
perceptions do not correspond to things as passive records, that is, 
one can see a leaf, a drug or a botanical specimen in the same thing. 
However, this definition is insufficient to claim that our 
representations do not include any information about the world that 
in part causes them. The subjective interest guiding attention steers 
but does not necessarily twist data. It can be used to distinguish a 
friend in a crowd. Acknowledging that our concepts do not perfectly 
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reflect things does not mean to exclude that something in the world is 
linkable to the objects of our descriptions. That we have no 
independent access way to that something does not let us deny any 
difference between the world and our experiences. Many scientific 
theories describe the extent to which culture affects perception and 
conceptual schemes. Nevertheless, we have reasons to hold that its 
influence is partial and always combined with the causal influence of 
the way the world is independent of our descriptions (McCullogh 
1998: 17–19). 
Important questions involve the epistemological nature of time 
scales, which are actually used by historians, in relation to causal 
nexuses and determination of the meaning of events. Time itself is a 
configuration template of past events and the innovative role of 
Annales historiography in this respect is well known. What counts is 
the difference in the time scales in terms of duration (long, middle 
and short term; cyclical or serial time) through which significant 
events are ordered or in terms of connections with individual actions 
and sudden changes, with superindividual, collective structures and 
natural rhythms (e.g. Fernand Braudel’s Méditerranée, production 
modes and civilisations). Simultaneously, unique and linear 
relationships or a more complex pattern of time dimensions may be 
present. Historical facts are identified on the basis of their meaning 
as crossroads of different time scales; they are reducible neither to 
particular cases of a law nor to unique individualities, but they 
acquire relevance and pertinence only in relation to the deep 
structures of a sociohistorical and cultural background10. 
The discovery of a constitutive function for time that is upstream 
of the historiographical praxis can contribute to weaken the sense of 
completeness of the past as a corollary of a linear and progressive 
 
10 Consider on this point Borutti (2015)’s acute analyses. 
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conception of historical time. Relevant evidence can be found in the 
results of Reiner Koselleck’s refined concept of history 
(Begriffsgeschichte). It was centred on concepts’ temporal structure 
and semantic shift, especially the categories of the sociopolitical 
sphere (democracy, liberty, crisis and history). The German 
philosopher anchored the sense of time to anthropological and 
ontological roots and argued that its structure depends on an 
irreducible tension between Erfahrungsraum (space of experience) 
and Erwartungshorizont (horizon of anticipation). The cultural 
changes in the way of seeing history hinge on the variation in the 
balance between these poles. For example, the projection to the 
future, which is a dominant trait of the modern culture (whose 
analysis is one of Koselleck’s main interests), is explained through the 
detachment of the anticipation horizon from the space of experience, 
that is, from the repetition of the past. According to Koselleck, this 
concept is a profound change that is bound to the end of a rural 
culture with its image of a cyclical and slow time in harmony with 
natural rhythms. The point of interest here is the double value of 
historical concepts, both cognitive and pragmatical. They have an 
indicator (Indikator) and performative function, that of an active 
agent of historical changes (Faktor). They reflect past experiences 
but open future horizons. Concepts define a horizon and open 
possibilities and they have a transcendental dimension of construction 
in addition to the comprehension of the historical reality. In this 
pattern, distinguishing the specific position of historians with respect 
to agents is difficult. Intuitively, they do not coincide. Thus, Koselleck 
proposed a constructionist–hermeneutical model of historiographical 
work and insisted on the potentially infinite plasticity of the past and 
the limitless possibility of redescribing and reinterpreting past events. 
The past is every time reconstructed and expanded in relation to the 
demands of new contexts and cultural needs. It is also the object of 
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an uninterrupted creative revision11. Therefore, it is unstable and 
indeterminate at least epistemically. 
Other aspects should be added in terms of the tensions in 
philosophers’ metahistoriographical studies. Although the contrasts 
between naturalistic and hermeneutical approaches cannot be 
proposed again in light of the methodological and thematic 
enlargement of the historiographical framework, the problem of the 
specificity of an interpretative and symbolic dimension of the past 
facts, as methodologically distinct from the forms of the causal 
explanation, is still open12. As such, the necessity of modulating 
ideals of truth and objectivity should be further discussed by 




Recently, in the philosophy of language, studies on the grammars of 
time have produced a great deal of analyses and new acquisitions 
about the informative and semantic role of verbal inflections, verb 
tenses, active verbs and sentences, duration adverbs and temporal 
particles. Other important lines of research have dealt with the 
relationship between location information and internal articulation in 
qualitatively distinct stages or on the accomplishment of the 
mentioned processes13. 
 
11 See Koselleck (1979). 
12 An exemplary presentation of the issue is in Cassirer (1944: 217–260). The text 
argues for the irreducibly symbolic dimension of history considered as a branch of 
semantics. This characterization is entirely carved out on limited questions and cas-
es concerning history of culture, ideas, art, and, on the basis of that, I think it can 
propose again the epistemological dichotomy causality/meaning. I also think the 
privilege that is generally granted to this kind of historiography should be revised in 
the light of the above mentioned very complex scenario of the second half of the 
20th century. 
13 For a rich overview of the direction of research and a critical analysis of the 
developments of these topics, see Bonomi and Zucchi (2001), as well as the 
relevant collection edited by Klein and Ping Li (2009). 
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Previously, the semantic reformulation of the conflict between 
realists and antirealists, particularly about the epistemic and 
nonepistemic conceptions of truth, dominates the scene because of 
the work of Michael Dummett. The conflict had a major impact on the 
great philosophical disputes around metaphysical, ontological and 
epistemological questions. The main discord was as follows: do 
sentences really exist whose truth transcends our possibility of 
verification/acknowledgement not contingently but in line of principle? 
According to the nonepistemic concept of truth as correspondence, 
the sentence ‘the cat is on the carpet’ is true if it corresponds to the 
extralinguistic fact that the cat is on the carpet. This fact makes the 
statement true. The realist stance is essentially motivated by the 
concern of not confusing the property of being true with that of being 
held to be true in such sentences. A factor in (mathematical, physical 
or historical) reality may make a sentence true regardless of that it is 
under our cognitive grasp. A well-formed and nonvague sentence has 
determinate truth conditions: it is either true or false; if it is not true, 
it is false regardless of our possibility of verifying it. However, this 
intuition generates many problems; for instance, if one goes beyond 
simple and comfortable cases such as ‘the snow is white’ or ‘the cat is 
on the carpet’, they are clearly used in conditions falling into our 
control or acknowledgement possibilities. According to the epistemic 
perspective, the truth of a sentence must be somehow bound to the 
possibility of verifying or acknowledging the truth conditions thereof, 
namely, the rational acceptability or guaranteed allegeability of a 
sentence at least in principle. The truth with a human face must be 
able to be expressed in terms of actual or possible knowledge. The 
sentences about the past on which Dummett specifically worked are a 
family of expressions that make the application of the nonepistemic 
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truth model of correspondence more controversial, similar to 
mathematical ones and those concerning infinite domains14. The past 
is a typical domain in which truth condition acknowledgement is 
problematic, if not impossible. The question always remains open in 
many ways and even from this area of research elements emerges in 
support of the most radical forms of constructivist and antirealist 
positions. They are avowedly interested in emancipating historical 
knowledge from the constraint of the concept of truth and the 
immutability of the past. 
Leaving now the area of the philosophy of language and history, 
we may consider studies more directly connected to experimental 
research. Cognitive and neurobiological studies are of particular 
interest for our aims. A great and intense activity of classification and 
conceptual clarification concerning empirical investigations has been 
carried out in this field. The developments of this activity raise 
relevant theoretical questions. One of the most controversial themes 
about the privileged role of the notion of trace and the (causal or not) 
relationship with past events. According to causal theories, one 
cannot talk of memory without at least an indirect causal connection 
between an event and a trace. The distinction of memory forms on a 
(short or long) duration basis has great relevance in the literature. It 
is intersected with the clarification of the types of memories as 
distinct in implicit (e.g. the procedural one, which is the capacity of 
maintaining the ability) and explicit or declarative (the capacity of 
preserving information). The latter can be assembled in the subsets 
of episodic (particular and singular experiences) or semantic (general 
experiences) memories. The distinction amongst the description 
levels of memory is very much relevant. Person-focused descriptions 
are based on mental images and able to distinguish the memory type 
 
14 See Dummett (1978; 2004). About the problems and evolution of Dummett’s an-
ti-realist positions see Murphey (2009: 14–22) and Salis (2015). 
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from other types of experience traces (perception and imagination). 
Descriptions in terms of physicobiological processes and neural 
mechanisms regarding the subpersonal cognitive level are provided. 
Eventually, a solid body of studies have addressed representational or 
conversely the direct and immediate nature of memory. 
Immediately, heated discussions are included in this analytical 
platform. On the one hand, the ‘archive view’ conceives memory as a 
device passively recording, preserving and reproducing past 
representations through possibly exact copies. For a long time, the 
encoding, storage and retrieval (ESR) model was considered a sort of 
inescapable pretheoretical framework for studying memory. On the 
other hand, constructivist perspectives reduce or eliminate memory 
reproductive functions. Memory rather would have the task of 
producing detailed representations consisting of coherent 
autobiographical narrations (irrespective of real past happenings) to 
deal with anticipations, future planning or social unity support. In 
other words, memory should merely shape and colour past 
experiences. Indeed, the validation of new memories would always be 
circular, hinging inevitably on precedent memories, whose reliability 
on the successive ones is automatically assumed as their own. From 
this point of view, the past is far from appearing as complete or 
(much less) determinate and immutable. On the contrary, it is 
something built, organised and handled by the selective and narrative 
procedures of memory15. 
 
5. 
Changes in the image of time emerging in the ‘hard’ sciences are 
particularly relevant and profound. At first glance, they present one 
 
15 My considerations drew from Bernecker (2008) and Bernecker and Michaelian 
(2017). From the latter rich collection I consider above all: S. Bernecker, Memory 




of the hardest theoretical challenges. Indeed, they complicate the 
task of clarifying the relationships with the common-sense view on 
the flow of events and the objective determinacy of the past. 
Therefore, we need to dwell more on the introduction of these 
scenarios and make a simple discussion because of the technicalities 
of the literature. 
The most astonishing results come from the advanced frontiers 
of physics and particularly from certain interpretations of relativity 
and quantum mechanics. Many scholars considered the 20th century 
physics in terms of a progressive disintegration of the notion of time 
up to its final eclipse in the analysis of the elementary matter 
processes. According to this vulgata, the 19th century paradigms of 
thermodynamics laid a solid foundation to explain the common and 
historiographical intuition of the course of events as the psychological 
and cultural côté of an arrow of time bound to the irreversible growth 
of entropy. Successively, relativity theory would have dealt a severe 
blow to this view by eliminating any possible reference to a universal 
clock regulating the equivalences amongst local times, which are 
necessarily connected to specific reference frames and by referring to 
a deformable and curved spatiotemporal order within which 
gravitational waves gather. 
The most radical threat would come from quantum physics. It 
would push the interpreter into a direction that, on the one hand, let 
her argue for the irrelevance of the time variable in theory’s 
descriptions; on the other hand, it opens to a re-shuffling of the 
relationships amongst past, present and future and reduces or 
eliminates the irreversibility of the ‘arrow’ of time. Suffice it to say 
that the phenomenon of entanglement violates the nonlocality 
principle of classical physics and raises the issue of reformulating or 
abandoning the notion of objectivity. According to Copenhagen 
interpretation, which was proposed by Niels Bohr, nothing is ‘real’ at 
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a microscopic level until it is observed. In quantum mechanics, before 
observation, particles are in an indeterminate superposition of 
possible states. Given an ‘initial’ interaction between the quantum 
states of two particles, they turn out to be linked to each other 
(precisely, ‘entangled’) even if great distances divide them. A state 
change in one of them instantaneously produces a measurable effect 
on the state of the other, developing a ‘spooky’ action at a distance. 
This experimental situation is reflected at a theoretical level in 
the opposition between two ways of seeing time: a presentist view, 
that is, because it is focused on the ontological primacy of the 
present and an ‘eternalist’ view16. According to the lexicon used for 
the first time in John E. McTaggart’s famous essay, the rival views are 
of two kinds: the one is dynamical (A-series theory) and the other is 
static (B-series theory; see McTaggart 1908). Dynamical theory is 
very intuitive, because it corresponds to the common experience of 
time as a continuous passage of the things from one state to another 
one; the course of the events from the past towards the future 
implies the precise distinction of three temporal determinations. In an 
ontological sense, only present exists, given that the past ‘is no 
longer’ and the future ‘is not yet’. Time has an unstable and hard-to-
define character of an incessant becoming from the past to the 
present and from the present to the future. A fixed point in this view 
is the irretrievability of the past and its immutability opposite to the 
(at least partial) openness of the future with respect to our causal 
influence. Some processes are irreversible. It is the case of the 
thermodynamical phenomena or human actions with their causal 
effects. From these dimensions, it is natural to think the universe 
moves on towards ever new states, which are different from the 
present one and without the same state being able to come back. 
 
16 In the following context, I use the analysis of the fine volume by Dorato (2013). 
See also Orilia (2012). 
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In the specialised literature, presentism is generally considered 
as at odds with special relativity according to which the present has 
no privilege. Arguably, it is not in harmony with Newtonian physics, 
whose laws are symmetrical and invariant with respect to temporal 
changes. The time variable is immaterial for their formulation. 
Moreover, a natural law is supposed to be valid always and 
everywhere and to have then an a-tensional sense. Thus, a 
discrepancy emerges in physics between the macroscopic events of 
our experience, which is oriented in time according to an irreversible 
direction and the microscopic world, which is governed by 
symmetrical laws with respect to the past and the future. No 
ontologically privileged present moment is found at the subatomic 
level. The simultaneity of two events is always relative to a particular 
inertial observer, but this discovery undermines a key notion of the 
experience regarding the position of events in time with respect to 
the present. Relativistic physics guarantees that the present is never 
directly experienced by virtue of the light signal travel time, from the 
event to the inertial observer’s position (or to the particular reference 
frame thereof), which is negligible only for short distances. What the 
past or the future is according to us can be present according to 
different observers. The past and the future actually exist according 
to other reference frames and local backgrounds in some regions of 
complex and fragmentary spatiotemporal cosmos, which are the 
arena of physical events. Thus, eternalism seems to provide a more 
suitable metaphysical alternative that conforms to relativity theory. 
The future and the past have equal ontological dignity and have a 
relationship between one another that is different from what common 
experience affirms. According to the supporters of this view, the 
presentist paradigm is committed to anthropocentrism, which is an 
illusory result of the mix of the features of some physical phenomena 
with our physiological, cognitive and cultural constitution. If one 
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denies the ontological primacy of the present, the two depending 
corollaries, namely, the time direction and the immutability of the 
past, lose their (anthropocentric) footing17. 
Various developments of the described situation are presented. 
The criticism of presentism, as fostered by quantum mechanics, could 
have extreme and paradoxical outcomes that are not yet delimited or 
pondered in their scope. Quantum experiments and quantum 
computers that process information taking advantage of the 
interactions between particles according to the laws of quantum 
physics open the door to the theoretical possibility of a retroaction of 
the future on the past. A classical trend of research about the 
‘quantum surrealism’ revolves around a two-slit experiment. This 
concept has been proposed several times in different forms since the 
19th century. It is variously explained on the basis of the classical 
interpretations of quantum mechanics (from the standard 
Copenhagen interpretation to those proposed by Louis De Broglie, 
David Bohm or, more recently, Aephraim Steinberg; see Wiseman 
2016). The experiments carried out at the Washington University St. 
Louis of Toronto by the group of the physicist Kater Murch explicitly 
put into question the temporal asymmetry of the microphysical 
processes18. The quantum reaction of a superconductor is monitored, 
reducing its temperature to near absolute zero and letting it act at 
two interacting energy levels. Monitoring is conducted by projecting 
photon beams at two different modalities (strong and weak). 
 
17 Though not taken into consideration as it deserves, Nicolai Hartmann’s work is 
particularly rich in deep and rigorous analyses, insights and innovative arguments 
on this subject. Certainly, his ontology of the past in particular should be examined. 
I will mention here only some sections of his system directly connected to our 
discussion. For the criticism of the anthropocentric conceptions of time focused on 
the primacy of the present one should consider ch. 29 in the sec. IV of Möglichkeit 
und Wirklichkeit (Hartmann 1938, 2018) or sec. I of Aufbau der realen Welt 
(Hartmann 1940) or sec. III-IV in the first part of Philosophie der Natur (Hartmann 
1950). 
18 See the report of Murch’s group (Tan et al. 2015). 
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Information units (qubits) travel simultaneously between two levels 
and detect states of entangled particles, which are able of 
instantaneous at distance interactions. Therefore, the behaviour of a 
particle seems to influence its precedent states, upsetting the 
classical temporal coordinates. 
 Steinberg reached a moderate conclusion by considering 
experimental outcomes as compatible (from a mathematical and 
practical viewpoint) with the standard indeterministic interpretation of 
the quantum phenomena and the deterministic interpretation 
proposed by De Broglie and Bohm, who depicted the possibility of 
drawing the real trajectories of particles. Murch’s view seemed more 
radical and willing to admit the retroaction of the future on the past: 
microscopic material processes suggested that time in the quantum 
world flows in all directions and not uniquely in one way. He argued 
that the reasons why the macroscopic processes seem to follow a 
unidirectional flow in compliance with the arrow of time remain 
unclear. 
The attempts of integrating fundamental physics and information 
theory are connected to this context. The precursor of this approach 
was the great physicist John Wheeler19, as attested by his famous 
motto ‘Everything is information’. The quantum world would be better 
describable as a flow of relations and processes than as a set of well-
defined and stable objects. This relational mixture may be well 
represented in terms of information. Thus, the quantum of 
information becomes the building block of reality. Various research 
projects have worked systematically in line with this view and 
produced original results20. 
A rich and interesting theoretical approach is based on the 
 
19 See the notable tableau depicted by the physicist P. Harpern (2017). 
20 Amongst Italian scholars’ studies, the study of D’Ariano et al. (2017) should be 
considered.  
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nonexistence of the time variable in fundamental physics without 
totally denying a form of reality for sequential and directional time. I 
think that this view is clearly expressed in the position of an 
influential expert such as Carlo Rovelli, who highlighted the crisis of 
the following image of time: 
 
Something uniformly and equally flowing in the whole 
universe and in which everything happens. A single present 
exists in the whole cosmos, a single ‘now’ that is the reality. 
The past is fixed, happened, the same for everyone. The 
future is open and still indeterminate. Reality flows from the 
past through the present towards the future and the 
evolution of things is intrinsically asymmetrical between the 
past and the future. We thought that this concept is the 
basic world structure21. 
 
However, at the fundamental level, the concept is not that similar to 
the perceived time. Neither space nor time exists in the elementary 
grammar of the world. Nothing ‘present is common to the whole 
universe’ and ‘no difference is observed between the past and the 
future in terms of the basic equations governing events in the world.’ 
We must be aware that the gravitational field dynamic itself – ‘a large 
moving jelly’, Rovelli wrote – is a high-level approximation. In its 
microscopic structure, the world is made of flows and processes, not 
of things similar to material objects. In particular, the quantum world 
can be characterised through three fundamental properties: 
granularity, namely, discontinuity; time position indetermination for 
‘particles’, each of them being in an indeterminate state, in 
 
21 The passage is from Rovelli (2007: 46). Consider also the entire third part of this 
work and Rovelli (2014). Both books introduce the theme of the trace and often re-




superposition of states, until it interacts with some other entities; and 
relationality of physical variables, because any happening can be 
concurrently before or after another one. 
Rovelli directly addressed the basic questions to look for 
nonreductionist answers. How can our sensation of a continuous flow 
emerge from such a timeless world? Certainly, a role is played by 
some partiality and blurring given by our limits of interaction with the 
world. However, he argued that the direction of time can be 
considered a ‘local’ real element connected to the low entropy of the 
cosmic region where we belong. It is ‘real but perspectival’. On the 
contrary, the time variable is only one of the possible forms of 
description of the world and we can reduce it to a rigid and uniform 
board only for the slow (with respect to the light speed) velocities and 
short distances we move in. It is a third-level approximation, which is 
conditioned by our perspective of beings that are constrained by the 
entropy growth horizon. Rovelli concluded that time is stratified as 
much as a complex set of independent layers, which are differently 
approximated in accordance with the physical scales being considered 
(velocity and magnitude). The notion of cause with its temporal 
asymmetry, which is important in our ordinary experience of a 
change, loses strength and meaning in the description of quantum 
phenomena. The laws of elementary physics describe smaller or 
larger regularities, not causes. 
Furthermore, the landscape of theoretical physics (with all its 
speculative aspects) is not uniform. For instance, the American 
physicist Lee Smolin, a recognised authority in the field of quantum 
gravity, wrote an essay in 2013 that differed from our topic. He 
considered the background of the current physical research as 
favouring a real rebirth of time (Smolin 2013). 
 
 
Critical Hermeneutics, special 2 (2020) 
XXIX 
6. 
The attention to the neurological bases of the sense of time 
represents another important aspect of our topic. Factors opposing 
the reduction or interpretation of time as a merely illusory 
phenomenon are related to biology. For example, Arnaldo Benini’s 
‘neurobiology of time’ takes advantage of the meeting of disciplines 
such as biology, physiology and neurosciences to propose an innatist 
interpretation in which time is firmly anchored to the functional 
possibilities of the nervous system (Benini 2017)22. 
 
Given that the time sense mechanism is distributed in most 
of the brain and that they spontaneously work, we need to 
change the brain so that we can think of a timeless reality. 
A pointless enterprise, all the more so – here’s Benini’s final 
jab – since the brain should be the one that changes itself. 
[…] 
The living matter follows the same principles as the lifeless 
one. […] Right, but, if psychology is biology and biology is 
based on physics, then physics cannot exclude the reality of 
time through mathematical calculations. 
 
In such a view, time and space are natural categories that are 
produced by a primitive mechanism without which animal survival 
would not be possible. Time is neither illusory nor merely perceived, 
but is in a certain sense doubly real because it is realised in nervous 
systems and biologically specialised devices that are real components 
of the evolving universe and because it is a mechanism governing the 
becoming and interpreted as a life essential dimension in agreement 
with neurosciences. With more ontologically committed terms, Benini 
 
22 I take into account in particular ch. 12 and 13 of Benini (2017), from which the 
following quotations are drawn. 
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wrote: ‘The brain created unidirectional time because the reality to 
order is such […] nothing returns’. Even if it is not a structure of the 
empirical world and is not perceived as an external event, time is 
real; rather, it is ‘one of the nearest realities to the heart of nature’. 
According to Benini, the scepticism about the reality of time, common 
amongst physicists, stems from the fact that they do not adequately 
consider studies on the biological and neuroscientific bases of time 
itself. 
We have reached the end of our introductory journey. As seen 
above, different and conflicting signals originate from the research 
areas we have talked about. With the problem of time and its 
features, our cultural universe appears to be broken by two deep 
rifts. Undoubtedly, a line of strain is in the vertical gap between 
common and specialised languages, which is a situation we can still 
describe with Wilfrid Sellars’ word, i.e. a conflict between a ‘manifest’ 
image and a scientific image of things (see Sellars 1963). Regarding 
the progresses of physics, the astrophysicist Arthur Eddington 
exhibited the issue of an irreducible distance from the common-sense 
experience. This distance is illustrated by his often cited example of 
the ‘everyday’ table, whose features are unrelated to its microscopic 
properties as physics describes them23. The other controversial rift is 
horizontal in some sense and concerns the difficult reciprocal 
relationships between vocabularies and conceptual schemes 
elaborated in the shadow of different specialistic cultures and 
disciplinary matrices. The abovementioned divergences between the 
biology and physics of time certainly fall into this category. 
We face a complex situation that requires a certain caution and 
serious analysis to avoid hasty generalisations and precisely identify 
concepts and arguments at stake. We tried to work with this spirit in 
 
23 Consider the Gifford Lectures (Eddington 1928) that he gave in Edinburgh in 
1927. 
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the organisation of the conference and the present number. I think 
that the methodological and conceptual outcomes emerging from the 
published articles follow the lines exposed above. One cannot say a 
priori whether the conflicts in question here are always unsolvable. 
Firstly, one needs to understand how the tensional field of human 
actions in time emerges from its physical environment and whether 
the latter is a timeless world as some argue. Secondly, the specific 
relations of interaction and dependence existing between the different 
systems of description should be clarified. The landscape is quite 
animated and the conflicts are not only between viewpoints of 
different disciplines (physics vs biology or history) but also within the 
single disciplines. Interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary conflicts 
intersect, as in the mentioned cases of physical time and memory. An 
in-depth analysis may reveal that some controversies are unsolvable, 
whilst other can be illusory. 
From a patient work of conceptual clarification, new unifying 
keys could emerge and be useful to balance the fragmented 
information coming from specialistic studies. I will finally mention 
here a promising hypothesis that is oriented in this sense. The 
metaphor of the trace is often repeated in the interdisciplinary 
landscape we consider here. It is a heuristic working instrument, not 
a mere stylistic or rhetorical suggestion, to explore such research 
fields. We have seen that the image is quite important for historians, 
neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists in studies on memory. 
Notably, it can be relevant even in elementary physics. The notion of 
trace can be legitimately the common thread overpassing the barriers 
of specialisms and connecting somehow such different universes of 
discourse (e.g. natural, physical and biological universe; the 
psychological universe of memory and the neural bases thereof; 
historical and cultural universes). This concept can be also found in 
Rovelli’s analyses (for what concerns the cited texts). Traces are 
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everywhere in the universe and they describe the past because 
entropy was low in previous phases. Rovelli highlighted that 
something should stop and energy should be degraded into heat so 
that a trace can be formed. The sensation of determinacy of the past 
in opposition to the openness of the future is derived precisely from 
the abundant presence of traces of past events. Cerebral traces bring 
about evolutionary advantageous maps, allowing the predictions 
about the future. The brain is a time machine that can continuously 
establish nexuses amongst past, present and future events, because 
it is a structure regulated by evolution in such a functional 
architecture. In this sense, Rovelli relied on Dean Buonomano’s 
neurocognitive positions24. 
Maybe, but it is not given for granted, future studies will confirm 
the fruitfulness of the notion of traces as a bridge concept and the 
actual possibility of interdisciplinary connection25. As for now, we can 
only take notice of the theoretical challenges derived from a context 
that imposes to compare, rethink and improve methods and 
languages irrespective of the different argumentative consistencies of 
the existing forms of antirealism or alethic scepticism about the past. 
One should not draw suggestions or hasty generalisations from the 
plurality of time images. One should not also try to harmonise them 
in a unified system. On the contrary, understanding the precise 
differences and possible links in the multiplicity of languages is an 
important work, but it is long, complex and difficult if one only 
considers the extent and level of specialisation at stake. A powerful 
criticism stems from the current debates. It raises awareness on the 
complexity of the mechanism originating the images of the past in 
 
24 See Rovelli (2007: ch. 12-13) and Buonomano (2017). 
25 An interesting text to understand the difficulties of any interdisciplinary project 
about the notion of trace is that by Changeaux and Ricoeur (1998). They clearly 
and critically show the distance between a neuroscientific and psychological 
perspective and a hermeneutical one, as well as the methodological, scientific and 
philosophical difficulties of a meeting among them. 
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different kinds of studies. In such a perspective, we decide to create 
a moment of interdisciplinary exchange by giving the floor to 
philosophers of various origins (epistemological, linguistic and 
ontological) and to authoritative representatives of the historical and 
experimental research about past events or memories. 
The articles collected here provide a very interesting material 
from different points of view and exclude simplifying shortcuts or 
hypotheses such as the thesis of eliminating or reducing sequential 
time in macroscopic phenomena and human action to an illusion or 
the past to the more or less deformed (extra-cognitively conditioned) 
human representations. Every essay seems to sustain the search for 
an explanation of the emergence of the temporal determinations that 
considers all the passages of the process in a conceptual and 
empirical way. These passages include the layers of fundamental 
physics and the stratifications of biology, psychology and history. 
Every essay also acquires the articulate forms of increasingly complex 
systems of phenomena. 
 
Cagliari, March 2020 
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